

Frequency-Minimal Moving Target Defense using Software-Defined Networking

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Overview

- Cyber attacks such as DDoS are on the rise
- Need for intelligent counter-strategies to protect critical cloud-hosted applications
- Challenge is to minimize cloud resource overhead and loss of availability to thwart attackers
- Lack of adequate protection against attacks can impact reputation and cause millions of \$\$ in damages to applications in healthcare and finance




Figure 1: System and Attack Model

Novel MTD Architecture within a Cloud Platform

- We propose an intelligent MTD based VM migration technique that can proactively and reactively migrate VMs using SDN to defend against DDoS attacks

- Novelty of our technique

- Our SDN-enabled migration scheme performs dynamic VM migration, whereas existing works resorts to IP address shuffling
- Our scheme is both proactive and reactive unlike most existing works which are purely reactive




Figure 2: Software Architecture of our proposed MTD

- Our scheme is adaptive to attack probability and attack budget, whereas existing schemes use a migration frequency which is static

- Our scheme considers heterogeneous VM pool, whereas existing works assume a homogeneous VM pool

- There are two fundamental questions that we address with our technique:
 - What is the optimal frequency of proactive migration that protects the VM without consuming excessive resources or causing management overhead?
 - What is the preferred VM location for migration using SDN that does not affect application performance?

MTD Optimization based on Attack Probability

Objective I: Finding optimal frequency of migration that is frequent enough to avoid vulnerability, yet not too often to waste cloud resources

$$\text{minimize}(\text{Prob}\{z \leq T_m\})$$

$$\text{where } \text{Prob}\{z \leq T_m\} = \begin{cases} \frac{\mu_i(e^{-\lambda_a T_m} - 1) + \lambda_a(1 - e^{-\mu_i T_m})}{\lambda_a - \mu_i} & \forall \lambda_a \neq \mu_i \\ 1 - e^{-\lambda_a T_m}(\lambda_a T_m + 1) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Objective II: Finding ideal location for migration based on:

(a) candidate destination VM capacity, (b) network bandwidth between candidate destination VM and VM hosting target application, and (c) VM reputation in terms of history for previous cyber attacks

$$\text{maximize}(S_p^v)$$

$$\text{where } S_p^v = w_c \times C_p + w_b \times B_p^v + w_r \times R_p^j$$

$$\text{and } R_p^j = 1 - \frac{\alpha_p^j + \frac{\beta_p^j}{\beta_p^j + \gamma_p^j}}{\alpha_p^j + \beta_p^j + \gamma_p^j} \quad \forall p \in V$$

Experimental Testbed Setup

- Target Application: Just-in-time news feeds

- Application users are a prime target for cyber attacks, and their loss of service availability is loss of \$\$

- NSF GENI Cloud Testbed

- VM file migration module that is based on RSync and implements MTD controller decisions

- Our GENI experiment involved testing the optimal frequency of migration with our scheme (FM-MTD), in comparison with a static migration scheme that assumes homogeneous VM pool (SH-MTD)

- We considered attack budgets of 1/10 and 1/100, and attack pattern following exponential distribution




Figure 3: GENI Cloud Testbed for MTD protection of just-in-time news feeds application

Experiment Results

- Location Selection Comparison:
 - Ideal destination selection with FM-MTD resulted in up to 4X faster application response time compared to SH-MTD




Figure 4: Location Selection Comparison Results: Response time with SH-MTD




Figure 5: Location Selection Comparison Results: Response time with FM-MTD

- Optimal Frequency Comparison:

- Optimal migration frequency with FM-MTD showed up to 50% lower attack probability compared to SH-MTD




Figure 6: Frequency Setting Comparison Results: 1/10 attack budget




Figure 7: Frequency Setting Comparison Results: 1/100 attack budget

Our system of moving target defense will allow critical applications to be protected without a significant disruption for the user and proactively defends cloud providers against cyber attacks!

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